Match-fixing is one of the most serious threats to professional football. As noted in one of the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), CAS 2014/A/3628, "… the protection of the integrity of the competitions is absolutely essential for UEFA, as match fixing is considered to be the biggest threat to sport because it touches at the very essence of the principles of loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship". In this article CAS decisions for the period 2009-2014 on cases related to the liability of clubs for match-fixing by officials or players are systematically introduced into scientific circulation. For this purpose, the authors consider the arguments of the parties and CAS in disputes and make the following conclusions. First, the arbitration is not inclined to impose a conditional sanction or reduce the size of the sanction on the
Introduction
In this article we refer to the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport These rules of law have been used by CAS in all disputes declared by us. At the same time its own practice does not formally bind CAS, but in most cases arbitration refers to its decisions in motivation, thereby giving them a precedent character (Arbitration CAS 2013 /A/3256..., 2013 . As was mentioned, all sports organizations must adopt strong regulations and clear procedures regarding match-fixing (Veuthey, 2014: 102).
CAS also applies Swiss legislation in a subsidiary way, since UEFA is an Association established and located in Switzerland. First and foremost, it is the application of the principles enshrined in Swiss legislation (Arbitration CAS 2014 /A/3625…, 2014 .
For example, in CAS 2013/A/3256 the arbitration pointed out that article 2.06 of the UEFA Europa League Regulations, which was valid during the period of dispute, did not contain reference to the standard of proof. It was therefore necessary to turn to Swiss law to answer the question, since the standard of proof in such a case was a question of law that applied subsidiary (Arbitration CAS 2013 /A/3256…, 2013 .
Match-fixing in the most national jurisdictions is considered as a crime. In this context match-fixing is often compared to doping, noting the "fight" against doping (Zaksaite, 2012: 18) . Some academics, sports administrators and commentators posit that matchfixing is a more serious threat to the integrity of sport than doping (Carpenter, 2012: 13-24; Serby, 2015: 84) .
However, CAS may not apply the procedural rules provided by Swiss law.
For instance, the arbitration stated that it is possible to refer to CAS 2009/A/1879, according to which even if evidence might not be admissible in a civil or criminal court in Switzerland, this does not automatically prevent a sports federation or an arbitration from taking such evidence into account in its deliberations (Arbitration CAS 2013 /A/3297..., 2013 ). CAS`s discretion extends to all evidence the use of which does not violate the basic principles of Swiss law. So, in CAS 2013/A/3297, the arbitration emphasized that, in accordance with the public interest in finding the truth in match-fixing cases, and given the limited capacity of sports federations and arbitrations in obtaining and securing evidence, it is necessary to take into account even the evidence that is inadmissible in particular national legal systems. However, such actions of arbitration or jurisdictional bodies of sports federations are still limited; they cannot violate fundamental values of Swiss procedural public policy (Arbitration CAS 2013 /A/3297..., 2013 ).
Still on the subject of the evidence used by arbitration in match-fixing cases, note should be taken of the doctrine and jurisprudence. In CAS 2013/A/3256 it is pointed out that the virtue of an appeal system which allows for a full rehearing before an appellate body is that the issues relating to the fairness of the hearing before the tribunal of first instance "fade to the periphery" under the doctrine of Swiss law and CAS practice, which was first recorded in CAS 98/211 (Arbitration CAS 98/211…, 1999: 8; Arbitration CAS 2013 /A/3256…, 2013 .
Thus, there can be built a hierarchy of legal sources used by CAS:
1. Fundamental principles enshrined in Swiss law.
2. The UEFA Regulations.
3. CAS practice.
4. Swiss law.
Swiss legal doctrine and jurisprudence.
It should be noted that in fact there is no conflict between the acts of UEFA and the fundamental principles of Swiss legislation in the field of sports regulation. Thus, we can talk about the priority of Lex sportiva over national legislation when considering match-fixing disputes.
Before analyzing CAS decisions, we will refer to the description of the claimed disputes at the stage before the appeal.
Trial can be divided into three levels:
1. National football Federation.
2. UEFA.
CAS.
At the first and second levels, there are "first" and appellate instances, and it is also possible to examine the case within national jurisdiction. According to the category of cases we are interested in, there may be criminal prosecution on charges In the cases concerned UEFA bases its position on a number of proofs at once: thus, if one of the proofs was not considered during the hearings, it would not affect the club`s prosecution in accordance with the "comfortable satisfaction" standard. Let us turn to the positions of football clubs that have appealed to CAS and consider the two main arguments of the applicants:
1. The guilt of the players, officials and club's staff in misconduct as the grounds for holding the club liable has not been proven.
2. Mitigating circumstances were not taken into account; as a consequence, the sanction applied by the UEFA jurisdictional body is disproportionate to the violation.
Theoretical Framework
This study is based on the results of the previously published works of the few researchers of match-fixing in sports issues (Carpenter, 2012) , (Peurala, 2013) , (Zaksaite, 2012) , (Lukomski, 2012) , (Zaksaite, 2013) , (Veuthey, 2014) , (Serby, 2015) , (Kerr, 2017) .
At the same time, consideration of the composition of responsibility for matchfixing through the prism of key decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport for UEFA Disciplinary Regulations was not previously observed for the listed authors.
Statement of the Problem
The summarized and analyzed practice of the Court of Arbitration for Sport allows us to give an answer to a complex of sophisticated questions that arise in the process of proving by the clubs and UEFA of their positions regarding disciplinary responsibility for match-fixing:
Who, when clubs are offended for match-fixing, are the officials, as well as any persons affiliated with the club acting on his behalf?
The use of the principle of strict liability by UEFA allows clubs to be brought to disciplinary liability, but the main question still remains: is it necessary to prove the club's direct or indirect consent to match-fixing?
Is it permissible to use a wide range of evidence to confirm the fact of matchfixing, including evidence, the use of which is considered inadmissible due to particular national law? And if the evidence is admissible, but having a defect (for example, poor quality of translation or recording of negotiations), can such evidence be used in CAS proceedings?
Is it possible to extend the probation period and principle of proportionality to an 
Methods
In the research process the legal dogmatic method, the problem method, the legal modeling method, and the system method were applied. These methods have been already used by the authors in studying the disciplinary responsibility of the clubs for match-fixing in football.
The legal dogmatic method is used to analyze, to interpret and to systematize the offences of match-fixing in football as per the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations. The analysis is carried out on two levels. Firstly, the offences of match-fixing are analyzed from the point of view of the appellant clubs offended; secondly, -from that of the UEFA as the respondent; and thirdly, regarding the decisions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.
The empirical part of the study consists of the cases on match-fixing 2009-2014, in which the clubs were offended by their officials' manipulations. A full analysis of the cases being limited to the scope of the article, we will illustrate in general the positions of the clubs, UEFA and CAS on match-fixing as it is banned by the UEFA Disciplinary
Regulations.
Discussion The use of evidence deemed inadmissible under national law or evidence with factual flaws
Stating that the guilt of the players and the clubs' officials in misconduct as the grounds for liability has not been established, the clubs formulate two main arguments in support of their position:
1. Evidence of guilt presented by UEFA is insufficient or inadmissible in the proceedings.
2. The actions of the person who committed the violation are not grounds for bringing the club to responsibility for match-fixing.
Under the circumstances listed by us, the clubs consider themselves not subject to disciplinary responsibility for match-fixing, as the evidence collected does not comply with the "comfortable satisfaction" standard, which applies to this category of cases, based on the seriousness of allegation made (Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3625…, 2014: 131). Therefore, the club should be released from responsibility for match-fixing. The club believed that the translation provided by UEFA was not correct, as the Turkish word "ameliyati" was translated as "operation", the correct meaning of the word being "surgery". Due to this incorrect translation, the UEFA Appeals Body considered the word to be related to match-fixing operation, while in reality it referred to the surgical operation that the goalkeeper had to undergo at the end of the season and which took place in 2011. Therefore, in a telephone conversation, the Agent reassured the player that the latter should not worry about the future, but should concentrate Third, the applicants consider that the evidence collected by UEFA is not sufficient to hold the club accountable according to the "comfortable satisfaction" standard. For example, the club in CAS 2014/A/3628 noted that the UEFA Disciplinary Inspector had not provided any evidence other than the results of the recorded telephone conversation.
Therefore, it is impossible to say that the "match-fixing" took place, since there is no evidence of the transfer of remuneration for the violation. In particular, there is no evidence that the funds were allegedly transferred to the player: it is not proved that the funds were allegedly in the bag that was given to the player by the intermediary, and the player claims that there was a watch inside the bag (Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3628…, 2014: 35). In another case, the club drew the attention of the arbitration to the fact that the funds, which are payment for the actions aimed at match-fixing, were not transferred.
Therefore, there is no reason to consider these meetings as proof of the existence of certain match-fixing agreements. The Turkish club pointed out that the quotes from the listened phone conversation are not sufficient evidence of match-fixing, because such quotes as if confirming the match-fixing activities ("everything is fine, I've just had a meeting with the guys" and "we need to beat them") do not actually prove per se the existence of illegal arrangements (Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3628…, 2014: 35).
In another case, CAS 2013/A/3256, the club argued that the use of code phrases in the conversation had not been proven. In the opinion of the club, a telephone conversation related to construction projects, not to "match-fixing", and the club does confirm that special and incomprehensible terminology was used in the conversation.
However, the UEFA Disciplinary Inspector was wrong to consider this a special code to avoid revealing the fact of match-fixing. The person who used the named terminology is employed in the construction industry and manages a number of projects for the club. Therefore, the terminology in the conversation was related to one of these projects and did not represent a code for disguising illegal agreements (Arbitration 1920…, 2009: 3) . In this case, the expert`s conclusion was based on the fact that the size of the funds for the game was much larger than usual for such matches, and the dynamics of the coefficients was rather strange. In this regard, the expert and UEFA claimed that there was a manipulation of the match results. This report, as UEFA believed, was enough to admit the fact of manipulation in accordance with the "comfortable satisfaction" standard of proof. Although an alert by a UEFA monitoring system (as "machinery expert") is not a proof of match-manipulation either (Peurala, 2013: 275) . On the other hand, lastly, the CAS 2016/A/4650 decision can be seen to legitimize data analysis as the grounds for suspension of clubs (Kerr, 2017: 51) .
The position of CAS regarding the procedural possibility of applying the evidence is quite close to the position of UEFA. In its decisions, the arbitration emphasizes that the parties may invoke evidence that cannot be applied in accordance with national procedural law (the only limitation -Swiss public policy) ( 1. UEFA has never applied sanctions for commission of illegal acts by the third party. In previous decisions (cases of FC "Olimpiakos", "Fenerbahce", "Steaua", "Besiktas"), UEFA punished the team, which initiated the manipulation of the match results in their favor. In addition, when dealing with cases at the national level, only the involved club officials were prosecuted. The arguments of UEFA are objections to the applicants' arguments and can be systematized as follows:
1. The guilt of players, officials of the club in manipulation of results of matches as the basis of bringing the club to responsibility is proved;
1. The mitigating circumstances were taken into account, as a result of which the sanction imposed by the UEFA Appeals Commission is proportionate to the violation.
The arguments of UEFA can be divided in the same way as the classification of the applicant`s arguments previously presented by us. For example, in CAS 2013/A/3297, the position of UEFA was in justification of a possibility to apply a complex of proofs collected by national federation:
1. The evidence does not have disadvantages, due to which their use is impossible.
2. The evidence submitted is permissible to be used in the dispute resolution process in the jurisdictional bodies of UEFA and in the CAS.
According to UEFA, the application of evidence despite discrepancy to national procedural legislation is possible. 4. To prosecute, the club's consent to the actions of affiliated persons who manipulated match results does not matter, since the meaning of this provision is that clubs should take responsibility for the illegal behavior of players and officials. This is due to the fact that clubs sign the "rules of eligibility" for a particular competition and have an obligation to comply with the goals of UEFA (Arbitration CAS 2014/A/3625…, 2014: 149). Therefore, the consequences of the violation are not considered mitigating circumstances and, moreover, this circumstance is completely irrelevant to the "rules of eligibility" provided for by the regulations. As you can see, the clubs and UEFA presented their arguments on two issues that can be systematized as follows:
1. Has the guilt of officials, players, and other affiliated employees of the club been proved in the commission of the offense and are there grounds for bringing the club to responsibility?
Were mitigating factors taken into account when imposing sanctions?
In accordance with CAS practice, the appellant must prove that the sanction is 
Conclusion
Application of the principle of strict liability allows to bring to justice the clubs that participated in manipulating the results of the matches without proving the presence of the club's consent to illegal actions. Due to this principle, it is possible to bring violator clubs to justice, because de jure no one participant manipulating the results of a match can have the right to conduct such activities on behalf of the club.
To protect the integrity of the sport, CAS recognizes the use of a wide range of evidence to confirm the fact of perfect manipulation of the results, including the evidence, the application of which is recognized to be unacceptable as per national legal systems. On the issue of applying evidence that may be considered inadmissible in individual national jurisdictions, the CAS is in solidarity with UEFA. At the same time, the parties still have the opportunity to provide arguments for the implementation of the "comfortable satisfaction" standard. Discretion in the selection of admissible evidence is primarily necessary for UEFA in order to prove the manipulation of the results, since, as CAS notes, this activity is secret and difficult to detect. Consequently, the refusal of a wide range of evidence would make the position of the parties unequal and would give an advantage to the clubs that are brought to justice.
At the same time, the practice of imposing disciplinary sanctions in conjunction with administrative measures is also a way to combat the manipulation of match results.
The established practice of CAS in disputes about the liability of clubs for manipulating match results is to refuse to apply a conditional sanction or reduce the size of the sanction on the criterion of proportionality, including its application to administrative measures, stipulated by the provisions of competition regulations under the auspices of UEFA (that are not sports (disciplinary) sanctions by their nature). Administrative measure in the form of deprivation of the right to participate in UEFA club competitions, provided for by the relevant regulations of the competition, is legally defined and allows to restore the integrity of the sport and the principles of fair sport. At the same time, the club that has violated the rules on the inadmissibility of manipulating the results, in addition to the deprivation of the right to participate in competitions, bears certain reputational and economic losses (funds received for participation in competitions, income from TV broadcasts, etc.). Since, as the practice we have reviewed shows, the club is highly likely to be brought to disciplinary responsibility on the basis of the provisions of the UEFA Disciplinary regulations, in addition to the administrative measure, an appropriate sanction is applied. With regard to this sanction, in contrast to the administrative measure, it is possible to discuss the principle of proportionality, which was demonstrated by the clubs in some of the cases (however, unsuccessfully). Thus, administrative measures and (or) disciplinary sanctions play a preventive function on the club monitoring the activities of their officials and players, as well as any affiliated club of the persons acting on its behalf.
We agree with Zaksaite who is stated to "… advocate such cultural policy that contributes to wider understanding of similar skills not trying only to eradicate or punish them. Disciplinary law and the scope of its application might be relatively narrow, covering only a sport's community" (Zaksaite, 2013: 289) . Match-fixing is a hidden corruption and sometimes it is difficult to find a clearly evidence of it. Although, even if an act is harmful enough to be punished, current sports jurisprudence in football made it possible to apply disciplinary liability even if it was stated that there was a reasonable doubt. Such practice is really doubtful especially if the sanction is severe (Lukomski, 2012: 291) .
